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Marketing and Development in the Transition Economies 
of Southeast Asia: Policy Explication, Assessment, 
and Implications 
Clifford J. Shultz, II and, Anthony Pecotich 
Geopolitical events have forced many countries in Southeast Asia to transform from 
centrally planned to market-oriented economies. The authors review the literature and 
introduce a model to help explain the forces and factors that seem to affect the success of 
Southeast Asian transition policies. The authors submit that though Southeast Asian 
gradualism or constrained capitalism continues to produce positive macroeconomic results 
and consumption opportunities, more expansive reform policies eventually could be 
required if these transition economies are to continue to prosper and enhance the welfare of 
their people. They conclude by discussing marketing implications and directions forfurther 
research. 
Impressive growth rates among the countries undergoing 
economic transformation in Southeast Asia have led 
many policy analysts, investors, and marketing planners 
to conclude that a Southeast Asian model of gradual transi- 
tion-controlled economies guided toward the market by 
authoritarian governments-might be optimal for economic 
development. These countries-Cambodia, China,1 Laos, 
Myanmar,2 and Vietnam-have strengthened their 
economies and on balance have enhanced living conditions 
for their people. Indeed, the "radical" policy decisions to 
make economies market oriented and in turn initiate far- 
reaching systemic changes have affected many consumers, 
marketing institutions, and entire societies profoundly (e.g., 
see Shultz, Belk, and Ger 1994). These policy changes in a 
Southeast Asian context, and the pace and scope of their 
outcomes, are sources of keen interest and debate (cf. Asian 
Survey 1996; Belk and Zhou 1986, 1987; Doner 1991; 
Hewison, Robison, and Rodan 1993; Kapstein 1996; Kopits 
and Offerdal 1994; Ljunggren 1993; Naya and Tan 1995; 
Robison and Goodman 1996). 
We believe they also warrant further examination vis-at- 
vis marketing and public policy. Therefore, our purpose is to 
synthesize the research findings and much of the academic, 
popular business, and institutional literature on economies 
in transition with the intent to (1) frame the zeitgeist on 
reform policies and marketing in transition economies, par- 
ticularly in those countries that adhere to the Southeast 
Asian model; (2) illuminate what we believe are some com- 
pelling issues during economic and social transformation; 
and (3) provide a rudimentary model that should generate 
further discussion and research efforts on marketing and 
public policy. 
Policy Reform and Economic 
Transition 
The end of the Cold War signaled the end of "conflict 
between extreme forms of progressivism-socialism and 
neo-classical capitalism" (Sakakibara 1995, p. 8). Both of 
these ideologies, which emerged from the traditional feudal 
systems, emphasized the increase and fair distribution of 
material wealth as major social objectives (Fukushima 
1995; Sakakibara 1995). The aim, therefore, was to solve 
the same economic problem and the controversy emanating 
from the different approaches to its resolution: The social- 
ists emphasized state planning; the neo-classicists, the mar- 
ket. The collapse of the Eastern bloc not only indicated the 
failure to deliver an acceptable standard of living to con- 
sumers, but also suggested that the world was entering a 
new era of economic competition and cooperation (Weiden- 
baum 1995). To survive in this new age, nations will have to 
find structures for social and economic interaction that will 
allow for compromise and accommodate the needs of mul- 
tiple interests. The political orientation and ensuing eco- 
nomic policies, as the world shifts from military to eco- 
IThroughout the text we refer to China, which is an influential player in 
regional policymaking. The categorization of China as part of Southeast 
Asia can be problematic because its boundaries extend to Northeast Asia. 
However, labels such as Southeast Asia, East Asia, Pacific Rim, and Pacific 
Basin frequently are used without clear, definitive, enumerated distinction, 
and unique distinctions occur or have occurred only in the cases of formal 
alliances or associations such as the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), or Asian 
Free Trade Association (AFTA). Our decision, therefore, is based on the 
desire to avoid the more cumbersome "East and Southeast Asia" descrip- 
tion and to recognize China for its contributions to and evolving role in 
Southeast Asian policy and marketing development. 
2Formerly Burma. 
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nomic competition, must be moderated by mature pragma- 
tism, in which "tolerance rather than impetuous belief, bal- 
ance rather than progress, are respected" (Sakakibara 1995, 
p. 8). 
This pragmatism and a desire for accommodation are per- 
haps most clearly visible in the transition economies of 
Southeast Asia, as the leaders of these states struggle to 
bring prosperity to their people and to maintain power. The 
shift away from orthodox Marxist-Leninism, however, was 
not the result of a grand and altogether willful conversion to 
capitalism; more accurately, the decision was thrust on them 
by a combination of economic and sociopolitical forces and 
policies that rendered Southeast Asia a region of disparate 
economic winners and losers. The obvious losers were 
Myanmar and the Indochinese countries of Cambodia, Laos, 
and Vietnam; all cases in which the ruling authorities were 
committed to economic management by central planning. 
By the mid-1980s, war devastation and/or economic mis- 
management had rendered these countries among the poor- 
est in the world, or to paraphrase Lee Kuan Yew, the world 
simply left them behind (Zakaria 1994). The conditions 
were so severe that the World Bank and other international 
agencies became unable to make reliable estimates, even of 
how poor they had become. The command economies 
unquestionably contributed to the deplorable poverty. It was 
particularly galling for the traditionally proud and xenopho- 
bic Vietnamese to see countries such as Singapore, Thai- 
land, and Malaysia catapult their economies and living con- 
ditions so far beyond Vietnam that it will take at least 30 
years to catch up.3 
Nevertheless, these nations have made reformist moves 
toward the market system with the hope of achieving a peace- 
ful transition to affluence-typically indicated by increases in 
economic growth, living standards, and the emergence of a 
consumer society more generally-without the cataclysmic 
loss of control, conflict, and internecine warfare apparent in 
parts of Eastern Europe (Shultz, Pecotich, and Le 1994). The 
difficulty of the task is compounded by the need to change an 
established system while lowering trade barriers and encour- 
aging foreign investment. For example, before 1979 China was 
closed largely to the outside world, and the "open door" policy 
of 1978 ushered in a new era leading to a freeing of the market 
(Blaho 1994; Glassman 1991). The complexities of this task 
have been well described by Marer and Zecchini (1991, p. 3): 
The transformation f these economic systems is, by its nature 
and scale, a task and an effort without precedent in economic 
history. The conditions of economic distress that characterize 
these countries at the beginning of the transition make the task 
all the more urgent. The lack of an adequate body of knowledge 
from which to draw guidance adds to the complexity of their 
undertaking. No 'Western' economic experience can be applied 
directly to solve these problems since they have unique and 
unprecedented characteristics related to the command-type eco- 
nomic mechanism and the particular economic structures that 
have developed over several decades. 
This lack of knowledge is not the only impediment to 
progress. Another major problem stems from the entrenched 
nature of the extant system and the social structure within 
which it exists. Although these governments could be hon- 
estly seeking a formula to deliver a higher standard of living 
to their people, the political reality makes true progress diffi- 
cult. That is, a government that champions reform and transi- 
tion must produce tangible results, but radical measures and 
the subsequent immediate austerity often lead to erosion of 
public support. This turn of events then can lead to newer, 
regressive policies that conflict with the precarious transition 
policies. Another scenario might include implementation of 
ineffectual policies specifically implemented to mollify the 
various political factions, usually hard-liners within Commu- 
nist parties and/or established bureaucrats who disdain 
change, accompanying loss of status, and the reestablishment 
of the bourgeoisie. For example, after making steady progress 
Vietnam has slowed reform. Authorities there have sentenced 
to jail Do Trung Hieu and Hoang Minh Chinh (leading figures 
in the Communist Party) for demanding greater party open- 
ness and in so doing hope to send a warning to other possible 
reformers (Schwarz 1995). Even more recent regressive 
activities such as the "social evils campaign" in Vietnam 
(Vietnam Business Journal 1996), Cambodia's Borgia-like 
political in-fighting (e.g., The Economist 1995a; Lizde 1996; 
Ross 1994) or the ongoing surveillance/mistrust of Aung 
Sang Suu Kyi in Myanmar (e.g., The Economist 1995b, c) are 
testimony to the volatility associated with transition. 
Irrespective of these and other difficulties within the 
region, the extraordinary economic progress of Southeast 
Asia as a whole has been documented well (e.g., Solomon 
1994). The full magnitude of the changes has been described 
as the rise of the "new economic world order" (Schwab and 
Smadja 1994, pp. 40-41). This advancement has led many 
policy analysts to conclude that there indeed might exist a 
Southeast Asian model of development, previously intro- 
duced as a controlled economy under the aegis of authori- 
tarian governments transforming to a more market-oriented 
economy; some even suggest that, given the end of progres- 
sivism, this approach could be the template for economic 
development in the future (cf. Berger and Hsin-Huang 1988; 
Goh Keng Swee 1995; MacIntyre 1994; Wade 1992; World 
Bank 1993). 
We refer to this model as gradualism, or constrained cap- 
italism, because of interventionist policies implemented by 
authoritarian governments that tend to manage the pace and 
scope of the market economy. Gradualism permits state cor- 
porations to reform themselves and therefore to function 
like private enterprises while concurrently encouraging pri- 
vate businesses and a consumer culture. The objective is to 
transform slowly and with political stability, and in time, as 
stated most clearly by Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van 
Kiet (1994, p. 7), "To make our people rich." Furthermore, 
gradualism incorporates the core values demonstrated by the 
other economically successful Southeast Asian nations: 
respect for central authority, teamwork, outward orientation 
and respect for market forces, macroeconomic discipline, 
guided interventionism, and social/political/economic har- 
mony (e.g., Blackburn 1994; Petri 1993, 1995). And despite 
the fact that these countries are still poor, trends indicate 
they have made sufficient headway in a short period of time, 
3Thirty years is the number frequently mentioned by optimistic Viet- 
namese policymakers (e.g., Tran Quang Nghiem 1996); it is sometimes 
mentioned in casual conversation as the 2025 plan-that is, to catch up to 
the rest of Southeast Asia by the year 2025. 
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Figure 1. Foundations for Explication of Southeast Asian Transition Economies 
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leading to the conclusion the "template" argument could 
have some validity. 
Explication of Southeast Asian 
Transition Economies 
To preface this section we encourage readers to note that a 
veracious evaluation of Southeast Asian transition 
economies cannot be accomplished by examining any part 
of any social system in isolation. To focus on any nation 
without a reference to the wider aspects of the environment 
would distort and misrepresent the events. Therefore, it is 
necessary to focus on the region as a whole and to extract 
those overarching themes that are critical to the explanation 
,of the progress. The nations vary, for example, on the basis 
of culture, language, and political systems, and there are 
deep historical animosities among them. In some cases these 
animosities are so embedded in national psyches that further 
violent disputes are possible (Wanandi 1994), but the forces 
for integration and cooperation are also strong and are ener- 
gized further by the pragmatic attitudes of the current lead- 
ers, many of whom share a regional vision. The trend within 
the region is toward international accommodation as 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) expands 
and new trade blocs such as the Greater Mekong Subregion 
emerge (Brimble 1994), even though the conditions within 
many nations have not been characterized by political har- 
mony. It remains somewhat ironic that despite greater toler- 
ance and a movement toward regional integration, various 
forms of internal turmoil and repression remain problem- 
atic. (For a thoughtful discussion of authoritarianism, devel- 
opment, and repression in a particular Southeast Asian con- 
text, see Kyi May Kaung 1995.) Nevertheless, the move- 
ment toward regional cooperation and mutual prosperity 
marches forward (e.g., Chia and Pecotich 1988; Pecotich 
and Chia 1992). 
In the following section we discuss the foundations of 
Southeast Asian progress that sustain the march. Figure 1 
illustrates the foundations as a network of forces or systems. 
Each of them in turn has underlying factors that are critical 
to the long-term sustainable welfare of societies, nations, 
consumers, and regional integration. The arrows illustrate 
that each interacts with the others and that this interaction 
process is dynamic. However, though all the forces are inter- 
active and contribute to explication, some forces are more 
basic than others. Consequently, they are arranged in Figure 
1 from more to less rudimentary and left to right, respec- 
tively. The order of discussion is organized accordingly. 
Natural Forces 
Initial discussion of the model begins with natural forces 
because geographic attributes, natural resources, and 
weather patterns fundamentally determine policy and result- 
ing market and consumer outcomes. The intrinsic habitabil- 
ity and natural wealth of Southeast Asia have spawned and 
nurtured civilizations for millennia. Indeed, its climate and 
resources have incited intense competition and colonial 
intervention to exploit the vast riches of the region and set 
in motion the political machinations that led to present-day 
transition. That is, colonialism, the struggle for control 
among Marxist and capitalist powers, the rise of national- 
ism, and the eventual administrative withdrawal of colonial 
and occupying powers would not have occurred unless there 
were extraordinary resources for which people were willing 
to fight and make equally extraordinary sacrifices to control. 
This fact might not be appreciated fully, and we address it 
not only because of its historical relevance, but because of 
its importance to current and future policy decisions. 
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More specifically, each transition country varies in the 
condition and capacity of its natural resources, which form 
important geographic or natural constraints that affect the 
economy, markets, and consumers. Consider, for example, 
China's size, topography, and arable land-to-population 
ratio, which raise questions about this nation's ability to 
administer its economy and feed its people (Chang 1995; 
Swanson 1996). Vietnam has a coastline longer than that 
found between Seattle and San Diego yet is only 30 kilome- 
ters wide in some sections. Its capital, in the far North, is 
separated by dense rain forest from its commercial hub in 
the South, thus making difficult coordinated administration; 
its extensive coastline renders impossible the control of 
smuggling-which is a growing problem for the Viet- 
namese government (Ruderman 1996). Cambodia, the 
region's country with perhaps the most delicate agricultural 
system, is at the mercy of capricious weather patterns (Asian 
Development Bank 1994) and its position between the 
larger and more powerful Thailand and Vietnam have 
shaped and reshaped its borders for centuries (St. John 
1995). Laos is a landlocked country with the largest land-to- 
population ratio in Southeast Asia (Economist Intelligence 
Unit 1995). It is especially dependent on Thailand, Vietnam, 
and China for access to export markets and is frequently 
viewed by its neighbors as little more than a distribution link 
in the region, which in turn raises fears among Lao leaders 
about sustainable national sovereignty (Ardrey and Shultz 
1996). Myanmar is second in land mass only to China 
among Southeast Asia's continental nations, and its topog- 
raphy and climate are almost as varied. It is wedged among 
India, China, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Laos, and its 
"crossroads" location has given it a multiethnic population 
with separatist inclinations (Central Intelligence Agency 
1994; Economist Intelligence Unit 1994a). 
Although the resources are plentiful and varied, centuries 
of exploitation and tremendous population pressures have 
led inevitably to degradation. The condition of the environ- 
ment presents serious problems in most of the nations and 
affects their ability to enhance and sustain life quality. The 
conditions of some of the region's commercial hubs (e.g., 
Ho Chi Minh City, Phnom Penh) already have reached cri- 
sis proportions and require immense investment in urban 
renewal. Further economic progress will lead to greater 
stresses on air and water quality, traffic congestion, forest 
and fishery depletion, and soil erosion, thus creating a 
growth-preservation conundrum for these nations. Eco- 
nomic progress and materialism have costs, but leaders in 
the region, though making public statements in favor of pol- 
lution control and conservation, privately state they cannot 
afford comprehensive environmental protection programs.4 
Political exigency demands economic growth. So, geogra- 
phy, natural forces, and rapidly accelerating consumption 
pressures increasingly will play a role in Southeast Asian 
policy decisions, as long as there are decisions to make. 
Political Forces 
The political systems in the region are now guided more by 
the realpolitik of pragmatism and less by ideological orien- 
tations. Ideology, however, continues to influence the range 
of personal liberties, macroeconomic policies, financial 
allocations, social change, and the extent of intervention in 
other systems. Therefore, we have placed political, macro- 
economic, and social forces in close proximity to one 
another in Figure I and between natural forces and systems 
of administration. We discuss political forces here first 
because the most significant impediment to even greater 
reform still emanates from ideological constraints. 
Hesitancy and uncertainty on the part of government lead- 
ers are often due to the necessity to justify the reforms within 
the constraints of Marxist orthodoxy. It is perhaps inevitable 
that party ideologues will struggle to maintain the status 
quo. In some cases the struggle can take the form of archival 
"discoveries," which reveal that nationalist/Marxist leaders 
such as Ho Chi Minh might have advocated capitalist prin- 
ciples all along (Karnow 1996, p. 34). However, the desire 
to retain control, nationalism, and genuine concern for the 
citizenry are driving forces behind reform. These contingen- 
cies can lead to further weakening and perhaps even aban- 
donment of the orthodoxy, especially among the younger 
members of the various ruling governments in the region. 
We have conducted numerous field interviews with Com- 
munist party members from Vietnam, Laos, and the coali- 
tion government of Cambodia and Myanmar's State Law 
Order and Restoration Council (SLORC). Some form of 
abandonment is a common theme, but many of the most tal- 
ented mid-level party members committed to reform under- 
stand that to press too far would not be in the best interests 
of either the process or personal career management. So, the 
trend has been for governments to invoke a systemic market 
socialism-in other words, to reform from within, which 
entails accepting market forces and consumer culture, but 
maintaining control and rejecting political pluralism. 
Implicit in reform policies is the understanding that party 
labels, icons, and symbols are becoming irrelevant. The 
Communist parties of Vietnam, China, Laos, Cambodia, and 
the SLORC of Myanmar all have accepted the importance of 
market economics to the success of their countries' 
economies and citizens' welfare. More cynically, the desire 
to maintain the stranglehold on power is likely to lead to fur- 
ther reforms. Consequently, the Communist parties and 
SLORC increasingly mirror the more capitalist parties that 
dominate politics and influence economic trends in the other, 
more prosperous countries of Asia (cf. Gold 1986; Haggard 
and Cheng 1987; Johnson 1987; Robison and Goodman 
1996; Shultz and Le 1993). Ultimately, their legitimacy and 
longevity depend on economic growth and enhancement of 
life quality, and because those very outcomes are becoming 
increasingly evident, the reform process continues. 
China frequently is seen as the vanguard. It is difficult to 
envision other Southeast Asian nations following policy 
changes forged by China, their historical rivals, but eco- 
nomic success and increased social well-being inevitably 
attract the attention of leaders in countries pushed to the 
brink of economic disaster. Vietnam's doi moi or renovation 
(e.g., Dapice and Vallely 1996; Do Duc Dinh 1993; Fforde 
1993; General Statistics Office 1996; Pike 1992; Shultz 
1994), Laos' chitanakan mai or new economic mechanism 
(e.g., Bourdet 1994; Economist Intelligence Unit 1995; Lao 
Peoples Democratic Republic 1995; Rigg 1995), and Cam- 
4Based on a series of in-country interviews by the authors with govern- 
ment leaders. 
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bodia's post-Paris Peace Accord5 (e.g., Prasso 1994; St. 
John 1995) all at least have examined and in many cases 
attempted to follow China's lead. The ruling generals of 
SLORC now have recognized the utility of economic liber- 
alization, and policy incentives currently are producing 
modest if not overwhelming changes and positive consumer 
outcomes (cf. Abel 1996; The Economist 1996; Steinberg 
1993; Sundhausen 1995; Thein and Than 1995). 
Another political trend in the region is democratization. 
The noncommunist nations such as Singapore, Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia have moved in the direction of 
greater democracy, and as institutions develop, this augurs a 
more prosperous and peaceful future. The transition nations, 
in between bouts of repression and motivated by the disin- 
tegration of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (cf. 
Pecotich, Renko, and Shultz 1994; Shultz, Pecotich, and Le 
1994), also are democratizing their institutions slowly. The 
pragmatic nature of the political leadership suggests that this 
trend toward democratization will continue. We hasten to 
add that the trend is not tantamount o Western conceptions 
of democracy. Rather the political and economic systems 
are more open than they were, and thus transition seems to 
be inching from abject repression toward a middle-ground 
consumer culture: Citizens likely will be able to purchase 
many kinds of goods and services from around the globe, 
congregate and travel freely, and improve their material lot, 
generally, so long as they do not challenge the authority of 
the government (cf. Williams 1992). In effect, we are 
increasingly seeing a "softened authoritarianism" (Ljung- 
gren 1992). The democratization movement is measured 
and incremental, and though it is generally moving forward, 
it is analogous to a pendulum in that it occasionally swings 
backward. 
Internal political friction continues to hinder the reform 
movement. Support for reform is not unanimous among 
leaders, whose most critical agenda is to retain their monop- 
oly on power. Conservatives know that macroeconomic 
prosperity is by no means the only outcome of reform poli- 
cies. These policies also have changed the face of transition 
societies and threaten to bring even greater social change 
characterized by corruption, a widening gap between rich 
and poor, Western ideas on individual rights, and cries for 
political freedom that are imported along with investment 
capital and technology (Shultz, Ardrey, and Pecotich 1995). 
In addition to cries for political reform are pressures to 
embrace other ideas espoused by the world community, 
including respect for intellectual property rights, human 
rights, pollution control, environment preservation, and sus- 
tainable growth. Flagrant disregard for these issues eventu- 
ally could force the world community to ostracize these 
governments, though the current political winds do not sug- 
gest that scenario is tenable. Economic and trade sanctions, 
however, would retard development, thus forcing regression 
to purely agrarian economies. This outcome would be espe- 
cially troublesome because external pressures and the afore- 
mentioned environmental constraints also would cause agri- 
cultural growth to peak in the near future and would strain 
the production capacity of forests, soil, and fisheries. 
Clearly, political decisions ultimately affect many sectors 
and systems. Policies emanating from the softened authori- 
tarianism of the Southeast Asian leadership have enhanced 
economic development, in many instances life quality, and 
for some consumers even social mobility. Irrespective of 
whether this authoritarianism is anchored on the "right" or 
the "left," Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
more recently, China, Vietnam, and Cambodia all have made 
advances (Asia 1996 1995; Naya and Tan 1995; Robison and 
Goodman 1996). Now the least developed, transition nations 
in the region expect to sustain their gradualism policies. In 
addition to obvious immediate economic incentives, such 
strategic decision making also helps to diversify economic 
risks and ultimately alleviate the consumer suffering and 
potential social unrest that can result when central planning 
fails to deliver sufficient food and other subsistence-level 
goods, as we are now seeing in North Korea, Asia's last 
orthodox, centrally planned economy (Kim 1996). 
Macroeconomic Forces 
Macroeconomic forces in the region tend to be shaped and 
influenced by three factors: (1) ideology or the aforemen- 
tioned political forces, which determine the nature, structure, 
and operation of the economic system, including for exam- 
ple, privatization, deregulation, trade, and investment poli- 
cies; (2) the performance of the system; and (3) the consumer 
demand for the products and services within and enabled by 
the system. Privatization, a policy that encourages private- 
sector participation to eliminate or modify monopoly condi- 
tions and artificial preferences for public enterprises, is 
instrumental in solving the ownership problem (Rondinelli, 
Nellis, and Cheema 1983). Accompanied by deregulation, it 
has increased the level of internal competition and placed 
considerable pressure on previously protected institutions 
such as telecoms and energy suppliers. The welcoming atti- 
tude to foreign investment and the deregulation of trade have 
resulted in a high degree of interdependence among the 
economies of the region. Sixty percent of the trade in South- 
east Asia is intraregional, and this trend is growing at a rate 
of 8.1% per year (Forbes 1995; Leger 1995). This interde- 
pendence is being influenced by the pragmatic search for new 
ventures that contribute to the prosperity and security of the 
region. Concern, however, has been expressed that trade bar- 
riers could be coming down much faster than is desired or 
expected (Asian Business 1995), and domestic political real- 
ities could curb this general trend. The advance toward free 
trade, therefore, could be uneven, but it seems unlikely that it 
will be reversed permanently. 
Privatization, competition, and trade have stimulated 
technology diffusion. Countries that were condemned previ- 
ously to low-technology, labor-intensive technologies are 
now able to produce sophisticated high-technology products 
at low cost (Schwab and Smadja 1994), thus breaking the 
links between high technology, high productivity, high qual- 
ity, and high wages. The policy of relying on cheap labor for 
competitive advantage is likely to lose favor. The labor cost 
edge might be retained, in the short term vis-a-vis external 
competition from the United States and Europe, but it is not 
5Although transforming from a centrally planned, Marxist economy, 
Cambodia's situation is least reminiscent of China's, as its turning point 
was brokered by the United Nations and resulted in an open election and 
the establishment of the Royal Government in 1993. Unfortunately, Cam- 
bodia is also the least stable country in the region. 
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a viable foundation for a sound future within the region, 
where the flexible corporation could move from Thailand to 
China to Vietnam and so on. Moreover, in some of the 
nations (e.g., Vietnam, Cambodia), labor cost advantages 
seem to vanish in the realities of day-to-day business, 
including rent extractions, power shortages, and the like. 
All the transition economies face problems creating 
incentives to initiate and run efficient businesses and mobi- 
lize investment. There is no easy formula to solve these 
problems, but gradual reform has permitted wealth to be 
generated and protected, thus helping to create legal and 
financial infrastructures to expedite the reform process. 
Moreover, families can "nest" capital, in essence becoming 
mini-banks from which contiguous families or community 
members can borrow. This practice of informal savings and 
loan arrangements among families and friends is common 
throughout Southeast Asia (e.g., Le Ngoc Hung and 
Rondinelli 1993). Venture capital then can be used for entre- 
preneurship that can deliver goods and services to pent-up 
consumer demand. Indeed, this new entrepreneur-consumer 
relationship seems to be a pillar of the marketization renais- 
sance (United Nations 1993a). For example, in China, Deng 
Xiaoping's reform policies permitted farmers or entrepre- 
neurs to achieve modest wealth by responding to consumer 
demand and thus contributing to national welfare; these 
same policies enabled government to establish commercial 
enterprises. Vietnamese leaders observed the outcomes in 
China and implemented similar reforms. Initial Vietnamese 
efforts were supported by the countless small farmers and 
small-scale entrepreneurs. In less than a decade SMEs 
(small- to medium-sized enterprises) and privatized SOEs 
(state-owned enterprises) have become a dynamic economic 
foundation for the nation (Shultz, Low, and Ardrey, in 
press). Laos, Cambodia, and now Myanmar subsequently 
have enacted many of the macroeconomic reforms imple- 
mented in China and Vietnam. Included among these are the 
acceptance of private sector activity, the reversal of agricul- 
tural collectivization, a shift from central planning to a mar- 
ket economy, and the removal of price controls and subsi- 
dies to improve the countries' dismal economic perfor- 
mances. The economic development policies espoused by 
government representatives from Laos (Alounkeo Kit- 
tikhoun 1995), Cambodia (Tan Savuth 1994), Vietnam (Le 
Van Bang 1995), and Myanmar (Abel 1996) stress commit- 
ment to further reforms. 
Vietnam, eventually Cambodia and Laos, and now Myan- 
mar hope to follow China to the next step of more sophisti- 
cated entrepreneurial enterprises and the advent of indus- 
tries whose products will be capable of competing in the 
global market. Productivity and export measures indicate 
that each of these countries has made progress in these areas 
(Asia 1996 1995). However, some Western policy analysts 
believe this evolutionary process ultimately is destined to 
fail because they view "communist states" as inevitably 
totalitarian in nature and therefore a deterrent to entrepre- 
neurship (e.g., Goodman 1996). More thoughtful analysis of 
recent trends tends to view market socialism more broadly, 
that is, as a consolidation of power by a single party that 
tries to mobilize and change society through incentive struc- 
tures manipulated by revised, ideologically determined stan- 
dards of behavior. Market socialism has changed the incen- 
tive structures to reward entrepreneurship, and entrepre- 
neurs are now endemic to the countries in transition. 
Regardless of the strength of the entrepreneurial ethos, we 
cannot expect a far-reaching transformation that is national 
in scope without political and economic linkages among the 
powerful and influential nations that tend to harbor large 
reserves of capital and expertise. Economic success stories 
throughout Southeast Asia support this argument. By 
accessing these reserves, former less-developed countries 
have expedited the removal of many of the disabling condi- 
tions that nationalism and bureaucracy impose on business 
growth and created an ideological and economic environ- 
ment that facilitates agendas among the power elite. The 
market development that has spurred Southeast Asia's 
recent growth probably would not have occurred without 
arrangements negotiated at the highest level among entre- 
preneurs, bureaucratic chiefs, and foreign sources of aid, 
investment, and markets (McVey 1992, p. 9). This lesson 
has not been lost on the leaders of the region's transition 
economies. Market socialists in Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, 
and the SLORC now accept this development requisite. 
They increasingly work to channel citizens' energies toward 
economic goals and to attract foreign investment capital, 
while discouraging political reform. We have not yet seen 
economic shock therapy as a mechanism to break down 
these networks. Rather, these networks are used to induce 
positive economic results. Not coincidentally, government 
officials enjoy perks, promotions, and special investment 
opportunities; they share in free market economic successes 
and become supporters of new small businesses in the areas 
they control. Whether such favoritism can be sustained has 
yet to be determined. Some have argued the region's transi- 
tion economies eventually will be served better by initiating 
further reforms to decentralize and allow even greater num- 
bers of entrepreneurs to flourish (cf. United Nations 1993; 
The Wall Street Journal 1996). 
Social Forces 
We temper the preceding discussion with a healthy respect 
for social forces, which for reasons of parsimony we loosely 
categorize as culture, interaction, and character. In these 
conceptualizations, culture determines the most general, 
enduring set of values within the community (cf. Goode- 
nough 1971; Hofstede 1980). For example, the community 
could value commerce, altruism, material possessions, 
and/or formal education, or it could have shared values in 
apposition to all or some of these constructs. Interaction is 
used here as a term indicating the extent of the open or 
closed nature of the society, that is, freedom of interaction. 
Character is used to refer to the characteristics of the soci- 
ety-for example, the demographic structure. 
The ethnocentric, uninitiated observer of the region could 
use false broad categorizations such as "Asian" or "Chi- 
nese" to indicate a degree of homogeneity, which simply 
does not exist in Southeast Asia. Cultures, similar to nations, 
are "imagined communities" (Anderson 1995) among which 
there exists a vast diversity within each of the nations even 
without reference to national differences across Southeast 
Asia. Although some countries (e.g., Cambodia) are more 
culturally homogenous than others (e.g., Myanmar), within 
all the nations there exist cultural differences (including lan- 
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guage, religion, and ethnicity) that preclude a simple enu- 
meration (cf. Parrinder 1995). These differences present a 
challenge to further progress for not only the region, but the 
nations themselves. At an extreme level, cultural differ- 
ences, as much as economic disparity, have played a signif- 
icant role in the region's hostilities (e.g., Khmer attacks on 
Vietnamese fisherman in the Tonle Sap, Vietnamese 
assaults on Cholon Chinese, SLORC's military engage- 
ments with Karen separatists). However, it is also true that 
some of the nations in the region, at least on the surface, pre- 
sent a visible degree of cultural harmony and coexistence 
(e.g., Singapore). Furthermore, the pragmatism, the positive 
cultural attitudes to marketing and business, and the shared 
educational experiences of some of the major cultural 
groupings suggest that a slow evolution toward cultural rec- 
onciliation is possible, especially if mutual benefits of eco- 
nomic cooperation are to emerge. And though the underly- 
ing authoritarian paternalism that can make this possible is 
sometimes repugnant to Westerners, there is an element of a 
cultural truth in the following statement by Lee Kuan Yew: 
To this day, the majority of [Southeast Asians] do not want to 
be actively involved in political parties.... What they want is to 
have somebody governing them well and producing things that 
they want (Kamm 1995, p. 13). 
Accordingly, the view that the economic progress of South- 
east Asia is due to Confucian values of education, hard 
work, thrift, and social order has much currency in the East 
and the West (cf. Robison and Goodman 1995, p. 3). 
The existence of immigrant groups (e.g., the overseas 
Chinese) and interaction among cultures generally can serve 
as a cultural bridge between nations as well as a source of 
investment capital (Kraar 1993). Unfortunately, ethnic and 
political tensions still frequently impede investment from 
groups most keen to invest. Viet Kieu (i.e., overseas Viet- 
namese with skills and capital) are often reluctant to return 
because they remain fearful of a policy reversal in Hanoi. A 
similar problem exists for overseas Cambodians, Laotians, 
and Burmese. Similarly, the Chinese Diaspora also has con- 
tributed greatly to the economy of Southeast Asia (Chang 
1995, p. 955), though they have not always been well treated 
in Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries (e.g., Taft 
1994). Both the Chinese and Viet Kieu can be motivated to 
invest in Vietnam, for example-and some are investing 
despite the cool reception by the government-but policy 
reversals will make massive amounts of capital difficult to 
attract. Therefore, the reform movement would be stunted 
unless policies address cultural sensitivities and stimulate 
cross-cultural interaction and ultimately mutual gain. 
With regard to the character of the region, the evidence 
suggests that, demographically, despite the need for caution 
that prudent pragmatism dictates, the sheer weight of num- 
bers will continue to propel further growth. The size, den- 
sity, and growth rates of Southeast Asia make it integral to 
the global economic community. The region, depending on 
which nations are included, contains as much as 50% of the 
world's population while occupying only about 20% of the 
total land mass. This statistic includes China, the world's 
most populous nation, and five other nations with popula- 
tions of more than 40 million (Indonesia, 199.7 million; 
Myanmar, 45.4 million; Philippines, 68.7 million; Thailand, 
59.4 million; and Vietnam, 74 million). Some of the fastest- 
growing populations are also found in Southeast Asia: Cam- 
bodia (9.9 million) and Laos (4.7 million) are both growing 
at annual rates of 2.9% (Central Intelligence Agency 1994). 
Moreover, the populace tends to be dispersed in rural areas, 
but an emerging rural-urban drift is presenting major prob- 
lems. In many instances the movement from the country to 
the city has occurred too fast and has strained the socioeco- 
nomic infrastructure, leading to increased unemployment 
and the development of slums and a disenfranchised seg- 
ment of society. Furthermore, Williams (1995, p. 5) in a dis- 
cussion of regional demographic trends has stated that: 
Sex, together with age, is one of the two most important controls 
of future growth, and also, incidentally, of social ranking. In 
countries that are aiming towards development, the position and 
proportion of women and youth in society are important because 
of their influence on the composition of the workforce, their 
ability to contribute to national prosperity, and their ability to 
reproduce and so contribute to future population growth. 
This observation suggests that the burden of dependence 
might be high, but because Southeast Asia's population 
overall is younger than other parts of the world (more than 
half of the people are under 25 years of age, compared with 
the United States, in which the proportion is about a third, 
and Europe about a quarter) the demographic base for fur- 
ther economic growth also exists. This is not to discount that 
the dynamics of the population changes are many-includ- 
ing migration patterns, fertility rates, and mortality and life 
expectancies-all of which are changing and will have an 
impact on the development of the region. Other demo- 
graphic problems include population shifts resulting from 
the movement across borders by "guest workers," such as 
prostitutes and child laborers, and the tragic plight of 
refugees. Rising, balanced, long-term prosperity of the 
region could provide the solution to many of these problems. 
Administration Systems 
A modern state whose leaders hope to be competitive in a 
global economy cannot progress without the existence of a 
well-established and protected knowledge base, institutions to 
create and disseminate knowledge, and an apparatus to man- 
age knowledge and other resources. A review of Figure 1 indi- 
cates we have subsumed these entities in "administration" 
because, though each is administered interactively, their 
mutual outcomes tend to be co-dependent, and the content and 
process of each tend to be a function of the preceding forces. 
Knowledge System 
The knowledge system is the source of collective wisdom 
that ensures the transfer of experience and provides the 
foundation for innovation and change. The three compo- 
nents of this system are (1) the extent to which knowledge 
is well documented-that is, the degree to which knowledge 
is stored and diffusion technology facilities are readily 
available; (2) the degree to which it is independent-that is, 
can be relied on to be objective and free of ideological influ- 
ence; and (3) the degree to which it is applicable to market 
development and transition contexts. 
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All the transition nations have undergone a revolutionary 
phase, during which deliberate and often uncontrolled 
destruction of the historical knowledge base took place. 
Some nations such as Cambodia are emerging from what 
can only be described as one of the most horrific sociopolit- 
ical experiments in the history of humanity, during which 
almost a third of the population and the entire intelligentsia 
were lost (Chandler 1992). Losses of this kind followed by 
periods of strict censorship can cause irreparable damage 
not only in economic terms but more importantly to the col- 
lective psyche (Mydans 1996; Shenon 1995; Tith and Shultz 
1996). Fortunately, the leadership of even the most disad- 
vantaged of these nations seems to be recognizing that a 
nation cannot advance without a documented basis for 
expertise (cf. Schultz 1960; Simon 1988) and that concen- 
trated experience (e.g., USAID and non-governmental pro- 
jects in the forms of university and library development and 
visiting scholar programs), which facilitate the (re)estab- 
lishment of recorded knowledge, is critical for the progress 
of the region. Knowledge advancement and dissemination, 
however, is another agenda hotly contested between reform- 
ers and conservatives. A problem facing the reformers is the 
capacity of the ideologically conservative group to block 
reform by appealing to nationalism and the need to preserve 
cultural purity (e.g., Nguyen Duy Khien 1996). Neverthe- 
less, and regardless of "need," it will be increasingly diffi- 
cult to restrict access to databases and the flow of informa- 
tion through international networks. Moreover, it is evident 
that all but the most dogged conservatives understand that 
competitive economies-and implicitly national strength 
and independence-increasingly are linked to information 
technologies. Consequently, major public policy initiatives 
continue to be concerned with the management of the infor- 
mation technology boom. 
Education System 
The institutional conduit of knowledge will be an effective 
education apparatus, and for economic transformation and 
development to be successful, governments must place a 
great emphasis on the production of a trained and educated 
workforce (cf. Goh Keng Swee 1995, pp. 237-42). A macro 
assessment would suggest that, essentially, this apparatus 
consists of teaching, research, and practice. The practice 
component is emphasized because commerce and marketing 
are applied disciplines, and the test of the relevance of the 
knowledge development and teaching and research effi- 
ciency is in the effectiveness of application. Governments 
are facing some critical policy decisions that not only will 
affect the education system, but will have long-term "ripple 
effects" for the other administration systems. For example, 
should provision of education be public or private? Who 
should have access? Should the mastery of technical skills 
be emphasized? Which if any national models are most 
appropriate? There are many innovative possibilities in this 
area, including distance education, hybrid models combin- 
ing the best attributes of various national systems, as well as 
a revolutionary option of unified regional action; but funda- 
mentally, an education system that enables a comprehensive 
and competitive knowledge system is critical. 
Marketing and Executive Systems 
Knowledge and its advancement and dissemination will 
have to be leveraged and managed in an effective adminis- 
trative apparatus; therefore the final components are the 
executive and marketing systems. Although we list these 
systems separately in Figure 1, we discuss them under one 
subheading because of the inherent role of executive and 
management decision making to effective marketing prac- 
tice. Fundamentally, we refer to the professional practice of 
government and business marketing management. The qual- 
ity of it depends on the knowledge level of the executive/ 
management population, its motivation, and the extent to 
which it actually implements modern marketing practices. 
In many respects the rapid growth among the transition 
economies is evidence of a rudimentary understanding of 
marketing practice. 
The basic problem involves training a critical mass of 
managers and executives capable of administering organiza- 
tions that can compete in a global economy. Frequently, 
even the most ambitious apparatchiks and budding execu- 
tives have little knowledge of the philosophy and tools that 
are conducive to successful marketing management. An 
entire generation (or more) exists that has no knowledge of 
anything but the communist system. Human resources, 
therefore, are critical to transition. Returning nationals edu- 
cated in the West are an important resource of marketing 
skills. Furthermore, some reformers have the good fortune 
to administer nations whose citizens have firm recollections 
of capitalist traditions (e.g., southern Vietnamese) and 
therefore have been able to make more rapid transitions. 
Another important factor has been a dedicated and trained 
professional bureaucracy committed to economic reform 
and armed with the knowledge required to work in or to 
manage a marketing system effectively. Again, to use 
China's transition as an illustration, the reform movement 
cultivated bureaucratic and even military allies to sustain 
reform policies. Accumulating wealth became not only per- 
missible, but possible, as relevant stakeholders within the 
public sector recognized politically correct opportunities to 
prosper and maintain power (Overholt 1993). 
Transition has demonstrated that, from a marco perspective, 
marketing involves the orchestration of natural, political, 
social, and macroeconomic forces to assist in the reconcilia- 
tion of supply and demand through exchange process(es). The 
exchange or transaction is central to the process (cf. Bagozzi 
1975), and at the micro level it is critical that systems exist to 
facilitate exchanges that are expected to be voluntary and ben- 
eficial to all participants (e.g., Meade and Nason 1991). A role 
of government is to assist the unencumbered exchange process 
and to balance its efficient and equitable functioning. Essen- 
tially, governments of Southeast Asia's transition economies 
seem to have recognized grudgingly that the way forward 
could be less intervention, which will enable marketing sys- 
tems to evolve and result in consumer and societal benefits. 
Marketing also involves managerial processes, however, 
and it is at the micro level where the strongest reforms still 
are needed, for whatever the ideological shift, further 
progress cannot be made without changes to the corporate 
structure. A cornerstone of the Western marketing paradigm 
is the so-called marketing concept (e.g., Kotler 1994), 
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essentially, a normative philosophical imperative on which 
modem marketing practice is based. Paraphrased, the dic- 
tum is that marketing managers should pursue profit through 
a consumer orientation and an integrated strategy. The dri- 
ving force behind the marketing system is consumer needs, 
the satisfaction of which leads to profit. In this can be seen 
the critical error of controlled economies, whose raison 
d'etre to increase the material welfare of their people was 
exemplary, but who failed because of their disregard for 
marketing management principles. In addition, the failure to 
emphasize profit as a fundamental driving force of business 
doomed many of these nations to poverty because of the 
inevitable lack of capital for reinvestment. Moreover, 
though market advocates tended to emphasize price, in prac- 
tice many problems arose not so much from prices and price 
setting but rather from profit and its distribution. Profit, 
which is too often viewed as "exploitative," could be viewed 
more accurately as a performance indicator; but in these 
nations profit generally was regarded as a capitalist evil and 
therefore as having no function in a socialist economy. Even 
when a corporation enjoyed a surplus, its disposition was 
controlled by the government (the party), whose investment 
decisions were dominated by political power and ideologi- 
cal considerations rather than by national economic con- 
cerns and individual corporate or consumer welfare. 
Policies in relation to other marketing functions were 
based on a poor understanding of marketing theory and were 
too often openly hostile to marketing practice. Marketing 
communications provides a good example. In China, adver- 
tising was under tight state control until reformers suggested 
that advertising could be instrumental to the reciprocal rela- 
tionship between consumption and production and might 
prove to be an important catalyst to economic development, 
and therefore was not as subversive as was thought previ- 
ously (Swanson 1990). Since the reforms, the growth of 
advertising expenditure has been exponential, culminating 
with US$860 million in the first half of 1994-a 73% 
increase from the previous year (Simons 1994)-and has 
sparked keen interest among academics (cf. Pollay, Tse, and 
Wang 1990; Semenik, Zhou, and Moore 1986; Swanson 
1990; Tse, Belk, and Zhou 1989; Zhou and Belk 1993). 
Indeed, promotion is a well-developed marketing mix ele- 
ment in many of the transition economies and has been 
instrumental to successful market penetration and consumer 
decision making in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Viet- 
nam, as well as in China. It has become so effective that it 
has been regarded as a contributing factor to Vietnam's 
social evils campaign (Vietnam Business Journal 1996, p. 
16) and SLORC's decision to regulate tightly-through the 
Ministry of Information-all advertising content, media, 
and timing. 
Product policy, as with other elements, also was con- 
trolled centrally. It was the responsibility of technical pro- 
duction cadres guided by party ideologues. Industrialization 
schemes funded by a strong agricultural sector forced a 
focus on commodity and heavy-industry production. An 
implication is the utter disregard for marketing research. 
This important function was virtually nonexistent in most of 
the controlled-cum-transition economies, and marketing 
research agencies are only just beginning to appear in, for 
example, Laos and Myanmar. The general ignorance of 
marketing and in particular consumer behavior as well as 
the lack of infrastructure development had some disastrous 
consequences such as famine (e.g., Karnow 1991, p. 43). 
Poor development of distribution and transportation infra- 
structure contributed-and continues to contribute-to 
these problems. Further economic progress cannot be 
achieved without a rapid development of distribution chan- 
nels. For example, Myanmar, which is approximately 25% 
larger than Thailand, has approximately 40% fewer kilome- 
ters of highway (Central Intelligence Agency 1994). Sea- 
ports in Vietnam are in disrepair or incapable of unloading 
large container ships (General Statistics Office 1995); Cam- 
bodia's countryside is pocked with explosive ordnance, and 
Laos has underdeveloped rail and highway conduits (Asian 
Development Bank 1993; Economist Intelligence Unit 
1994b; International Monetary Fund 1994). 
These are but a few examples of the importance of mar- 
keting mix variables to the economic and social success of 
transition economies. In short, strategically managing the 
marketing mix is paramount to the long-term success of 
government run firms and organizations and to the newly 
privatized or emerging private-sector firms, sustainable 
growth, and consumer welfare. And though this thought 
might be painfully obvious to marketing practitioners, pol- 
icy analysts, and scholars in established market economies, 
it is still frequently lost on many of the policymakers in tran- 
sition economies. 
Discussion 
Policy and Welfare Outcomes 
We suggest that the Southeast Asian model of transition 
demonstrates an effective sensitivity to the complex interac- 
tions of many forces and systems. In so doing, it enables the 
change process to build the necessary institutions, while avoid- 
ing fatal damage to price stability, social harmony, or political 
support for future reform. The model certainly is not flawless, 
but the Chinese experience and more recently the experiences 
in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar have shown that 
a centrally planned economic system can adopt rudiments of a 
market system without an intervening social catastrophe-a 
conclusion that would be much in doubt if these countries had 
pursued the shock therapy strategies favored in Eastern 
Europe, which antagonized too many groups simultaneously, 
incited opposition, and ultimately stymied transition (cf. Gold- 
man 1991; Overholt 1993, p. 46). The essence of successful 
reform policies is usually a willingness or ability to divide the 
process into manageable phases and build a political con- 
stituency of supporters who see reform as serving their inter- 
ests. Therefore, shock therapy, in which political reform out- 
paces economic reform, has led many observers to conclude 
"an effective transition to the market system can be possible 
only in the context of economic development ... [and] on the 
creation of new capacities and not only-or primarily-on the 
dismantling of the old capacities" (United Nations 1992, p. 3). 
Throughout the process political pluralism has been 
rejected by the Southeast Asians, or at least Southeast Asian 
governments. SLORC and the "Communist" parties, pro- 
moting their softened authoritarianism rather than draconian 
political repression, remain in control. Moreover, their gov- 
ernments have been able to reduce inflation to tolerable lev- 
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els, while improving life quality for many of their citizens. 
In countries where gross domestic product per capita hovers 
around $200 to $600, and the slightest improvements 
become apparent, it would seem that the majority of citizens 
believe political pluralism can wait as long as the transition 
process produces improvements in living standards across a 
broad social spectrum of consumers. By delivering the 
goods, literally and figuratively, the leaders of Southeast 
Asia's transition economies are hopeful that they can avoid 
social and economic disintegration. At this juncture-and 
certainly relative to conditions a decade ago-it would not 
be unreasonable to conclude that gradualism in the form of 
market socialism has been "successful" because it has 
helped to balance macroeconomic forces, political control, 
and societal welfare. 
Having rejected rapid reforms and Western political val- 
ues, the leaders of Southeast Asia's transition economies 
look to China and, increasingly, Singapore as models to sus- 
tain their transformations. Given extant resources and by 
orchestrating political, marcoeconomic, and social forces 
the countries are designing administration systems that 
interact with marketing systems to produce impressive 
growth figures and some positive consumer outcomes. Yet, 
we contend these countries eventually will hit what we call 
the "transition wall"-flattening growth curves, competition 
for investment capital, and a more informed consumer soci- 
ety that will become impatient with gradualism. Hence, 
more expansive policies to introduce new technologies, 
access to information, and greater private sector control will 
be required if leaders hope to enable further growth, global 
competitiveness, and the most optimal outcomes for con- 
sumers. These more expansive policies also will stimulate 
information dissemination and greater pressures for political 
reform, or, depending on a country's orientation, "corrupt- 
ing influences" such as Western ideas encouraging icono- 
clasm, nonconformity, and dissent. 
Marketing Implications 
Leaders of the transition economies will try to administer 
the forces and systems presented in Figure 1 by replicating 
many of the policy formulas that spurred growth in other 
parts of Southeast Asia: relatively stable political environ- 
ments, guided market economies, foreign investment, cheap 
labor, and export development. They also will try to access 
expertise and management practices, not only from their 
more wealthy regional neighbors, but from other nations and 
sources as well. These contingencies create promising 
opportunities for marketers in the areas of education, 
energy, transportation, construction, consumer and indus- 
trial products, and communication. The consumer base 
already exists and is awesome, and though the consumers in 
the transition economies are generally poor and "unsophis- 
ticated," this too is changing. An increase already has 
occurred in domestic consumption due to the emergence of 
a middle class with activated needs, rising expectations, and 
the disposable income to spend for their satisfaction. The 
marketing and consumption conditions exploding in Ho Chi 
Minh City, Yangon, Mandalay, Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Vien- 
tiane, and the cities of southern and coastal China are pre- 
cursors of events to come and indicators of the possibilities. 
The sheer potential of these countries has inspired massive 
foreign investment and multilateral aid. These trends now 
force marketers to consider whether they can afford not to 
be in these markets. 
The benefits of participation could augment a regional 
strategy. Firms can protect international market share and 
capitalize on the strength of regional movements, such as 
ASEAN, the Greater Mekong Subregion, and the pandemic 
emergence of consumer culture. These movements will 
inspire further cooperation and some standardization. Ulti- 
mately, strategic participation must consider corporate 
ambitions, position, resources, and organization, while 
focusing on specific transition economies and also diverse, 
arcane conditions within these countries (cf. Lasserre and 
Schiitte 1995, p. 24). 
It is important to strive for multi-stakeholder benefits 
from investment. Interviews with government authorities 
and investors in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam 
indicate none of the governments want transition to culmi- 
nate in their countries becoming little more than export mar- 
kets for other countries' consumer and industrial products. 
Instead they seek mutually beneficial projects. This objec- 
tive affects marketing practices, which are encouraged to 
ensure successful transition and profitable ventures. More 
specifically, marketers are encouraged to stimulate eco- 
nomic growth and, ideally, to improve living standards for 
the largest number of people. Governments provide tax 
incentives, favorable locations, and other incentives for 
firms that initiate projects with mutually beneficial out- 
comes. Types of projects most frequently mentioned include 
all facets of infrastructure development, particularly trans- 
portation, sanitation, and telecommunications; agricultural 
marketing; manufacturing facilities; and value-added indus- 
tries. In short, projects that build or restore infrastructure, 
develop natural and human resources, share technology, and 
develop export marketing receive considerable support from 
multilateral aid sources and local authorities. More recently, 
projects that facilitate sustainable growth and development 
have been favored. 
The opportunities in transitional Southeast Asia are not 
without risks. The administrative and organizational prob- 
lems are immense and, without resolution, could destroy the 
potential. Balancing marketer interests with ongoing legal 
and political constraints, environment and culture preserva- 
tion, and the growing demands of a voracious consumer cul- 
ture will be extraordinarily difficult. These nations need not 
only capital, goods, and services but assistance in develop- 
ing a new form of marketing system. Legal and financial 
institutions are inadequate; human resources typically are 
ill-equipped to prosper in a complex marketing system. 
Investors therefore might need to provide assistance in 
developing all elements of the model illustrated in Figure 1. 
Indeed, administering a comprehensive strategy is the great- 
est challenge confronting marketers. The labor force, 
including managers, has little knowledge about or experi- 
ence with the marketing practices of the West or Asia's 
developed economies. This is particularly true in newly pri- 
vatized firms in which the personnel were, in effect, politi- 
cal appointments. So, a marketing executive could have sev- 
eral roles to play. He or she might be required to develop 
specific strategies for successful market entry, assist in the 
creation of an enabling environment in which business can 
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flourish, restructure the organization, train employees, 
and/or establish a marketing ethos within the organization. 
Political and social institutions throughout Southeast 
Asia's transition economies are becoming more marketing 
friendly, thus enabling marketing and executive systems to 
be more efficient and effective. Local workforces ordinarily 
are very keen to work for international firms and master the 
skills required to succeed in marketing organizations. And 
governments do want investors to succeed, within the con- 
text of win-win outcomes. "More marketing friendly," how- 
ever, is a relative description. Corruption and rent extrac- 
tions are still common, employees must be trained to per- 
form the most basic business tasks, and marketers generally 
are asked to succeed in a marketing environment in which 
the rules are changing as the game is being played. These 
pitfalls are the very nature of transition. In summary, mar- 
keting in these countries has been likened to playing football 
with moving goal posts: Just when it seems one is about to 
score, a new law is passed, policy shifts, bureaucrats inter- 
fere, electricity fails, orders are delayed, the distribution net- 
work collapses, and so on-that is, the goal posts move. 
Because of this unpredictability and uncertainty, successful 
marketers have added prudence, patience, and perseverance 
to the marketing mix (Shultz and Ardrey 1997). 
Future Research Directions 
Southeast Asia's transition economies are unique living lab- 
oratories in which to study the dynamic interaction of 
socioeconomic policy change, marketing, and consumption. 
We propose a model to explain the foundations of transition. 
In light of the analysis and discussion presented here, we 
believe the following suggestions are the most compelling 
research opportunities. 
The model is not exhaustive, and further development is 
appropriate. This could include, first, discussion and expan- 
sion of the foundations. Second, empirical tests of the rela- 
tionships among the various forces, factors, and systems are 
needed. Empirical testing could include within-country 
analyses, but cross-cultural and international comparisons 
would be especially fruitful. These efforts would enable us to 
determine which variables and combinations of variables are 
most likely to contribute to individual and societal prosper- 
ity. To that end, perhaps the single most compelling direction 
for further research would include more expansive conceptu- 
alizations and operationalizations of the construct-welfare 
outcomes. We have selected this descriptor purposely to 
stimulate thinking beyond the more normative and restrictive 
terms--development and progress-which connote eco- 
nomic gains and typically are measured by economic growth, 
inflation rates, per capita income, and purchasing power par- 
ity. Material possessions, as measured by some sort of stan- 
dard package (cf. Keyfitz 1982), are also fairly typical. We 
encourage marketing scholars and policy analysts to consider 
broader life quality measures, including, for example, health 
and wellness indicators, literacy, anomie, angst, social 
mobility, and perhaps social harmony and cultural (dis)inte- 
gration (cf. Belk 1988, pp. 118-22; Dholakia and Firat 1988). 
We submit that if governments, societies, consumers, and 
marketers accept that Southeast Asian transition is both 
inevitable and desirable, it behooves all of us to determine 
what will be its long-term and far-reaching effects. 
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